SE ET/HOPORN/HOCOHTRACT/ORCOM

dureau of intelligence and research - analysis - pedruary 14, 1993

1. CATCH-22 IN MABUL

State Dept. review completed

Alghan Delense Hinister Abdul Onder has just concluded an official visit to Hoseby where he presumably reviewed the military situation. Crosing mujabidin strength and a continuing decline in the size of the Alghan forces argue for Hoseby to increase its own military assistance. The most carious problem conficulting Hoseby, however, may be distillusionment and disloyalty within the Babrak regime. A larger Soviet military presence and sole would only intensify these problems.

٠

The latest Afghan Himistry of Defense report available to use on the battle for control of the countryside chose that, in opite of intensive Soviet offensives last upring and cusser, the mylahidin now have total control over too more districts (193 out of a total of 292) than they did at the beginning of 1932. The regime now controls only 72 (25 percent) of the districts and in another 36 districts controls no more than the main town.

The Eoviets are known to be commanded about increasing mujobidin arranged in Rabul and other cities and about the querrilles' growing use of SA-7 missibes. This winter, Cujubidin activity has been at least partially responsible for an acuse shortness of POL supplies which has haspared military operations. The POL shortness reportedly caused the Afghan air force to be grounded in late January. The guerrilles have also cut off the electricity supply in Rabul for most of the past oir weeks.

1:

neanwhile, the Dabrak regime appears to be crumbling from the tholde. Rifts within the ruling party are intensifying. Chalgis are reportedly being removed from astive duty in dilitary intelligence because of ouspected collusion with the resistance. The Khalgis, in turn, are capitalizing on a major scandal in the noney market involving Soviet advisors and high-level Parchamic to brand those implicated as traitors. Dev divisions within the dominant Parcham faction have appeared as disillusionment with Dabrak and the Soviets grows.

In the military forces, political disaffection is leading to further instances of mutiny and defection. The early January mutiny by 300 soldiers of the 25th division at Khost was followed later in the month by a general rebellion of the division's officers. They then joined amjahidin is an attack which cost the division substantial losses. In mid-January, inside help enabled mujahidin attacking an Alghan commands regiment base mear Rabul to destroy barracks and oix weapons depots. The regime has been forced to use increasingly entreme measures to replenish its depleted forces with new recruits, indicating that the available reserve is dwindling.

Moscow previously appeared willing to live with a military stand-off to give political politics time to work. The dilemma facing Soviet strategists now is that political decay in Kabul is spreading and may upost the military stalemate.

Approved For Release 2010/06/04 : CIA-RDP88B00443R001304040045-4